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Intellection and Indiscipline
PETER GOODRICH*

A discipline will usually become the object of study and its relationship
to other disciplines a moment of concern when its borders are precarious and its definition in dispute. Law, 'the oldest social science', is
arguably both prior to discipline - it emerges initially and most
forcefully as a practice - and without discipline, its object being
potentially all human behaviour. If law is necessarily between and
among disciplines, both prone to moonlighting and everywhere homeless, it will also always be in some mode of scholarly crisis. Certain
conclusions follow. Law is paradoxically dependent upon other
disciplines for its access to the domains that it regulates. The greater
its epistemic dependency, however, the slighter its political acknowledgment of that subordination. Which allows a positive thesis: the
epistemic drift of law can carry the discipline to a frank acknowledgment of the value of indiscipline both to novelty and intellection .
. . . there's some comer of a foreign field
That is for ever England. There shall be
In that rich earth a richer dust concealed;
A dust whom England bore, shaped, made aware ...
(Rupert Brooke)

The mapping of a discipline is both an historical and a theoretical project.
When the discipline in question is law and so itself quintessentially
disciplinary and disciplining, a reality conferring enterprise, then the project
is more complex still. 1 Viewed over the longue duree, as social structure, as

* Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, Brookdale Center, 55 Fifth
Avenue, New York, NY 10003, United States of America
goodrich@yu.edu
My thanks to Phil Thomas for his enthusiasm, to Christopher Tomlins for candid and
incisive comments, as well as to David Campbell, Chuck Yablon, and Alain Supiot for
discussion of the themes of this paper. Thanks too to Geoffrey Samuel for sharing his
work and for his tolerance, and finally to Linda Mills for grounding my thesis and
challenging my method.
I For a recent discussion of the juristic invention of the real, see 8 . Edelman, Quand /es
juristes inventent le reel. La fabulation juridique (2007).
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defining the trinity of persons, things, and actions as also institutions and
norms, law has played a coercive role in relation both to what counts as
knowledge and with respect to the hierarchy of disciplines. In claiming to
speak from the space of truth, in issuing verdicts, in thus promulgating
knowledge that exceeds the vernacular and mundane, law institutes its own
epistemic field - its jurisdiction - and in the process potentially negates
those disciplines that lay claim to evaluate the epistemology of legal
judgment. Not much of this is consciously purveyed in the legal texts most
normally encountered but, at common law in particular, is rather unwritten,
tacit, assumed through prior judgments and esoteric codes that allow judges
to claim variously that law is not logic, that law is not in the words but in the
truth, that the half truths of one generation become the norms of another, that
scholarship cannot comprehend the hard law that is case law, that on
occasion black is white, that men are women, that Barcelona is in London, or
that tradition, unwritten custom and use, conscience and good morals are
coeval with and inherently dictate what courts must do. The last vestiges of
serious social speech are arguably in the hands of self-professed fiction
mongers, euphantasists, as they were once called, who make things up, and
sometimes commendably so, to suit their case.
A discipline is a tradition, both transmission and betrayal of the past. The
etymology of the word is instructive, coming from a root meaning of disciple
or follower. The institutions of law are social constructions and what gets
passed on as knowledge of law is equally a product of relationships, events,
and networks of dissemination in the schola or classroom, in seminars and
symposia, in courtrooms and Inns of Court, chambers and council rooms.2
The discipline controls. It quietly establishes a hierarchy within that reflects
the hierarchy without. The social system divides epistemically into lesser
systems. In law too - and why should it be any exception? - groups form, a
hierarchy is ensconced in the new generation, social norms are established,
usually tacitly, and others - defined by race, class, gender, political or
theoretical affiliation, by lack of credentializing status - are excluded. The
establishment reconvenes in slightly younger form and the order of juristic
things gains its new mediations, its embodiment and expression, its tokens of
success, its symbols of status, its figures of truth. A new generation takes on
the self-disciplining functions of bureaucracy, and how easily that role seems
to be assumed. It is important to a critical apprehension of the sociology of
knowledge that such networks, movements, schools, trends, and fashions

2 F. Wacquet, Les Enfants de Socrate. Filiation intellectuelle et transmission du savoir
XVII-XXJ siecle (2008) provides an extraordinary history of the master-disciple
relationship in the academic world. On the conflict between discipline and law, see,
particularly, M. Foucault, Society Must be Defended (2003). For a recent collection of
encounters between and among disciplines, but with law not included, see J. Chandler
and A. Davidson (eds.), The Fate of the Disciplines, published as (2009) 35:4 Critical
Inquiry.

461
© 2009 The Author. Journal Compilation © 2009 Cardiff Uni versity Law School

also be traced as the lines of power or fields of force that contingently dictate
what constitutes truth about law, or in the rather shoddily applied terms of
research assessment exercises, what is excellent or internationally
recognized or properly part of the core discipline. Such lists or putative
appraisals of contacts and associations, the hierarchy of persons and actions,
texts and letters, becomes the form of life, the grid through which the
discourse of law flows. It plays its role, in turn, in defining and circulating
things, bodies, and words, the key elements in the longer-term patterns of
epistemological development, institutional presence and definition. They are
what defines the discipline and they also dictate its relationship to other
disciplines, because the interdisciplinary is as much a matter of culture and
mentalite, of the theory of comparison, as it is an abstract question of purely
systemic interrelations. 3
In what follows I will make the argument that understanding the interdisciplinary requires that the element of the 'inter', the aspect of
homelessness, of drift, of spaces between and without archos or law is
intrinsic. The properly interdisciplinary travels betwixt and through disciplines, it appears at intervals, is there and gone, indisciplined in the
positive sense of pleated and becoming, nascent, inchoate, not yet known.
There should be an element of indiscipline to the trajectory and evaluation of
any discipline. Irreverent questions are needed. Such as what did you enjoy?
Did this tell us anything? Was their passion, force, wit in this conversation?
And by the same token, flipside, stripped of regalia, status credentials,
hierarchical pinnacles, the aura of seriousness and self-worth, was this text or
speech still bearable? Relevant? Engaged with thought? Thinking for itself?
In that spirit I will first map the jurisdictions and disciplinary roots of our
dear English common law and subsequently move to track the relationship
between that history, those tendrils, roots, and branches of a tradition, a way
of knowing, a form of life, and the other disciplines with which law engages
and against which it oftentimes defines itself. The current crisis in legal
studies lies very much in the fact that law can no longer act in such a
negative manner nor claim such hauteur or superiority as once was the
effortless and not always unwarranted garb of the iuris peritus or doctor of
law.

3 This point is extensively and well argued by Pierre Legrand. See, for example, the discussion, ending with the concept of comparison as caress: P. Legrand, 'The Same
and the Different' in Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions, eds. P.
Legrand and R. Munday (2003) 240-311.
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MOS BRITANNICUS
First the backface, the long term of common law as a discipline. 4 It bears
restatement if only because the Englishness of common law is part of a
political imaginary, a literary fiction on the part of lawyers, and this merits
elaboration. As with any of the arts, the first question is the relation oflaw to
Latin and the transmission of the classic texts. The Renaissance reception of
Roman law falls into three parts. This tripartite geographical and loosely
jurisdictional division also suggests a threefold method of law. If we follow
the academic lawyer Giorgio Agamben's recent and riveting history of
Westem administration, a narrative that he elucidates as based upon the
Trinitarian theology of 'oeconomy' - meaning rhetorical disposition as well
as household management - then the trilogy of European legal methods can
also be understood in terms of doctrinal differences. 5
The position of the father is occupied by Roman law, the infinitely
detailed scholastic exposition of the Corpus iuris civi/is and the so-called
mos ltalicus of the predominantly German jurisdictions that stuck strictly to
the text, the letter of the Roman exemplar. 6 This law of the father could
speak through all merely temporal jurisdictions and local expressions. It was
the basis of a science whose laboratory was not even as diverse as Langdell's
later (and equally teutonic) reliance upon the constraint of the law library.
For the first generation of glossators, the science of law was based on a
single body of books housed in a single room in a tower in Pisa where the
Florentine manuscript of Justinian's text was guarded jealously behind
barred windows and a locked door, coming out only at night to be read under
guard and by candlelight. The second position, that of the son, both filial and
in Freud's terms oedipal, is taken by the French school, technically that of
the mos Gallicus, in which the work of the father is taken up by destroying
the father in favour of historical method, philological precision, and attention
to the earlier sources upon which the Corpus iuris was based. Justinian, or
4 G. Samuel, 'Interdisciplinarity and the Authority Paradigm: Should Law Be Taken
Seriously by Scientists and Social Scientists?' (2009) 36 J of Law and Society 43159. Samuel does not address the English Renaissance and Anglican humanist tradition
in law, nor does he include it in 'the rather short' history of its scholarship. What
follows here is a supplement and corrective. The notion of a backface is taken from J.
Selden, The reverse or back-face of the English Janus (first published as Jani
Anglorum facies altera, in 1610) and designates the hidden or 'other' history of
common law, its secrets, its skeletons, its positive unconscious.
5 G. Agamben, Le regne et la gloire: Homo sacer II,2 (2008), an extended meditation
on the maxim rex regnat sed non gubernat (the sovereign rules but does not govern).
T. Murphy, The Oldest Social Science? Configurations of Law and Modernity (1997)
makes a variant but comparable argument in terms of a distinction between the
penetrative scheme and the juridical soul.
6 For an introduction to the distinction, see P. Stein, Roman Law in European History
(1999) 75 ff. A more detailed discussion can be found in D. Kelley, The Human
Measure: Social Thought in the Western Legal Tradition (1990) chs. 8 and 11.
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more politicly, Tribonian, the chief compiler, became the name of an error. 7
Standing on the shoulders of the classical giant, the early modem humanists
relied upon philology, the historical method, to see further than the ancients,
and specifically further than Justinian and Tribonian who had so hurriedly
compiled the master text that was now to be unravelled.
Finally, third but not least, there is the mos Britannicus, the Anglican and
thoroughly mixed tradition of common law. 8 The holy spirit is a hybrid
figure, part father, part son, filial and rebellious, providential and practical; it
is associated by Agamben with the classical chorus, and specifically with the
rituals, acclamations, liturgies, and praises that both invest the sovereign and
express the genius loci, the unwritten spirit of locale or terrae. For the
English, it is the integrity of the island that seems to matter most and that
needs to gain expression in the insular identity of the laws. Thus the
expulsion of the first Rome, that of the papacy and the pontifical jurisdiction,
gained secondary expression in a fierce, if often imaginary, nationalism of
common law. This was a tradition distinct from that of the civilians, a pattern
of practices and precedents that preceded books of law and did not need
written expression except as contingent evidence of prior oral forms . The
seamless web of common law was a species of the map that is described by
Borges as being identical in size to the terrain being mapped. The common
law was a myriad of cases and it was cases, not book law, that were enrolled,
tabled, and fined, as also mooted and bolted.
Of all the three traditions of European law, the mos Britannicus is
historically the one that is furthest removed from the universities and the
least prone to exposition of its own method. Critical though the common
lawyers were of the civilians, they were also subject to and aware of the
lambasting of Anglican law as a junk-pile of cases lacking method and open
to manipulation, to borrow a phrase, by the most unlearned of learned
professions.9 This poor illiterate reason was not simply less than science, it
was not even a discipline, and so desperately needed the aid of Latin and
learning which could together reform and systematize this boundless
pursuit. 10 It was not only the civilians who criticized the common lawyers.

7 On the emblemata Triboniani, see V. Hayaert, Mens emblematica et humanisme
juridique (2008) 111-47. For discussion of emblems and other epistemological
engimas, see P. Goodrich, 'Legal Enigmas: Antonio de Nebrija, The Da Vin ci Code
and the Emendation of Law' (2010) 30 Oxford J. of Legal Studies (forthcoming).
8 Mos Britannicus is sometimes used to refer to the Druidic style but I am striving here
for a juridical neologism. It might be that mos Angliae is more accurate but it does not
fit the tripartite scheme quite so well.
9 The source is Erasmus, but the citation is from Sir J. Doderidge, The English Lawyer.
Describing a Method/or the managing of the Lawes of this Land ( 1631) 33 : ' in scome
some have called the crew of unlearned Lawyers, Doc/um quoddam genus
indoctorum hominum'.
IO Sir R. Wiseman, The Law of Laws: or the Excellency of the Civil Law Above all
Humane Laws Whatsoever ( 1666) is the most lucid, systematic, and convincing of the
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There was 'The Reverent and Learned Sir John Doderidge Knight, one of the
Justices of the Kings Bench, lately deceased' who in 1631, which truth be
told is not that lately, suggested in his treatise on legal method that we need
to commend some of the 'sedentarie' judges of yore, who:
were men excellently skilled in all generall good learning, as doe witnesse the
works of that worthy Judge Henry de Bracton , and John Britton sometimes a
learned Bishop of Hereford, skilfull in the Lawes of this Realme. 11

There were also dissident Anglican critics, internal opponents, amongst
whom we can trace a course which would include the theologian Cardinal
Reginald Pole, the philosopher Abraham Fraunce, the polymathic William
Fulbeck, the Ramist systematizer Sir Henry Finch, the jurist and humanist
advocates of codification of common law, Thomas Lupset, Francis Bacon
and, much later, Jeremy Bentham, and now, in this instance, ecce homo, a
university man, a francophile, my former colleague (his office was opposite
mine at Lancaster University back in the era of big hair), Professor Geoffrey
Samuel. 12 He asks two related questions. Is law a science? If it is not, if it has
no special disciplinary identity - as opposed to authority and status - then
what contribution does law make to the university or the episteme? These are
questions that sound peculiar to modern ears, anachronistic perhaps,
syncretic even in being radical and academic, internal to law and yet
sharply critical of its method.

THE LIBERAL SCIENCE OF LAW
The backstory is reasonably well known. At the time that the printing presses
turned to making common law available, the English, with their usual flair
for compromise and confusion, were teaching Roman law in the universities,
recording court proceedings in Latin, arguing in a garbled species of French,
and practising a predominantly local law, a formulaic system of writs and
local customs mixed with royal edict and decree. The first significant drive
to reform common law did not really aspire to present law as a science but
rather to introduce a little learning, a touch of disciplinary skill, a modicum
of method, into the presentation and teaching of law during the course of

critics. I traverse some of this literature in P. Goodrich, 'Critical Legal Studies in
England: Prospective Histories' (1992) 12 Oxford J of Legal Studies 195. On the
status of Latin and its educatiooal history, see F. Wacquet, Latin, or, the Empire of a
Sign: From the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Centuries (200 I).
11 Doderidge, op. cit., n. 9, p. 33.
12 My initial inspiration here is to respond to Samuel, op. cit., n. 4. Also important are G.
Samuel, 'Droit Compare et theorie du droit' (2006) Revue Jnterdisciplinaire d 'etudes
juridiques I; G. Samuel, 'ls Law Really a Social Science? A View from Comparative
Law' (2008) 67 Cambridge Law J. 288; G. Samuel, 'Can Legal Reasoning be
Demystified?' (2009) 29 Legal Studies 181.
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apprenticeship at the Inns of Court. A diversity of factors seem to have been
in play. The presses exposed common law to a degree of literate public
scrutiny, aided also by the translation of law texts into the vernacular. The
technological change brought a heightened degree of criticism of legal
pettyfoggers, and wrought a shift in the institutional self-consciousness of
lawyers. A more structural facet of reform was the paradoxical drive to
distance common law from both the papacy and the continent, the tincture of
Normanism, as it was then called, while at the same time resorting to
classical treatises on method, Roman rhetorical handbooks, and the latest in
continental theory to reform the Anglican morass of 'commune ley'. This
theological and political assertion of the sovereignty of the English monarch
and the national distinction of common law was ironically carried through by
borrowing from the very continentals who, at the political level, were being
disparaged and evicted from the curriculum of prefatory discourses to
institutional treatises, occasional polemics, and sparsely reported precedents.
The historical details can be followed elsewhere; for present purposes it is
important not to allow either temporal distance, or linguistic unfamiliarity, or
technical opacity to disguise the early meaning of interdisciplinary legal
study. For practical purposes, and notwithstanding its itinerant excursions
into the provinces, common law was a royally dispensed enterprise taught,
determined, and housed in a collection of Inns located next to the theatres in
central London. In American jargon, common law was an off-Broadway
production, a theatre of justice and truth that obeyed a distinct but not wholly
different set of unities to those of the dramatic stages that adjoined and on
occasion even reproduced it. 13 Legal drama was a ritual enterprise, a
ceremony of truth, a solemn exercise in dicta and dictation without any very
evident scholarly apparatus, disciplinary identity or theoretical support
beyond the theology of sovereignty and the diverse patterns of a multiple
linguistic and cultural heritage that mingled Saxon lists, Gaelic rites, and
Norman customs.
The common lawyers turned to their continental contemporaries. The
Prince or principal reformer resorted to by the scholars and humanists
amongst the common lawyers was Petrus Ramus, the neo-scholastic French
exponent of dialectical method as the means to schematize and so
systematize any discipline whatsoever. It was Ramist logic that inspired
the reform of legal method from Fraunce to Finch. It was an external and
foreign influence, a continental fashion in philosophy that brought common
law face to face with the failings of its pedagogy and the inadequacies of its
13 On the relation between the Inns of Court and the stage, see S. Mukherji, Law and
Representation in Early Modern Drama (2006) ch. 5; on the internal stages of the
Inns, see P. Raffield, Images and Cultures of Law in Early Modern England: Justice
and Power, I 558-1660 (2004). For the interesting architectural observation that the
Inns are designed as an ear, see D. Evans, 'The Inns of Court: Speculations on the
Body of Law' (1993) I Arch-Text 5.
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methods. So much so, if a pun is permitted, that George Ruggles, one of the
best of university based satirists of the logical and linguistic lacunae of
native law, invents the epithet Ignoramus - ignorant of Ramus - as the name
of his pitiful protagonist, 'an English lawyer', and of his eponymous play. 14
First point then, prima regula, common lawyers as a guild were resistant to
the competing claims of method and scholarship, publicity and vernacular
dissemination, that the Renaissance and the winds of humanist reform
demanded of them. They needed criticism, satirical prompting, theatrical
denunciation to force them to think and to change.
Common law grew up outside the established university system and
curriculum. It was an insular law lodged and developed in an architectural
island in London. It has a structural antipathy to scholarship and method,
expressed most directly and still to some degree, in the guild mentality of the
practice and the professional constraint upon education as most obviously
dictated by the latter stages of training, the non-academic phase. Let me not
get ahead, however, of either nomos or narrative. The initial point is that the
common law gloried in an oral and auditory tradition, a practical mentality
devised in lists and rolls, chancelleries and chambers, and it was only the
technological changes generated by print, pressure from outside, the barbs of
satire, and the castigations of pamphleteers and dramatists that forced change
into the other-worldly atmosphere of the juridical cloisters. A political
exchange, a coming to terms with the exigencies of the day which led, in one
clever exercise of renaming, to the Inns of Court becoming called 'The
Thirde Universitie' . 15
The second point, if one reads the sources, is that the emergence of
common law as a discipline was a rather sorry affair. The trajectory could be
framed as follows. Common law is inherently a practice rather than a theory,
method, or scholarly tradition. As a practice, it engages with the social
pathologies of everyday life, as well as facilitating the transactions of
commerce, the passage of property to and through death, the status and
offices of persons. It deals with everything and so also, in methodological
terms, with nothing. Law, as a practical activity, a guild knowledge of which
writ to file, when, and in what place, did not seem to cry out for scholarly
elaboration. The lawyer knew the law, a set of rites tied to the resolution or
displacement of conflict and controversy. To this all too recognizable antiintellectualism and dogma, the humanists opposed the necessity of art and
knowledge of 'the Sciences Liberall'.
14 G. Ruggles, Ignoramus. Comoedia Coram regia maiestate Jacobi Regis Angliae
(1630). The play was first performed in Cambridge in 1615.
15 See G. Bue, The Third Universitie of England (1615) vol. 3, at 966:
But admit that this city had no other colleges in it: but the Inns of Court, nor other
sciences studied and professed in it, but the laws, yet might London (as Justice
Fortescue well observed, and held) be as worthily styled a university as either
Angers or Orleans in France, or as Pavia, or Perugia in Italy, wherein the study of
civil law, is only professed.
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Using Sir John Doderidge, author of one of the first substantive treatises
on common law method, as my principal example, the initial task is one of
saving the profession from the potential embarrassment and consequent
social obloquy caused by uncouthness and stupidity. This very basic
desideratum gains expression as a double negative: 'We seeke not hereby to
institute I know not what manner of vulgar professor of the Lawes, no
common blatterer or temerist ... '. 16 There are plenty of similar examples but
the point is that of the evident expression of tension and stress between guild
and academy, cloister and community. The first task of scholarship is in this
respect curious and illuminating. A more rigorous education will produce a
better image of the lawyer, and Doderidge's text on method indeed begins,
first page, entry for content, by exhorting those that study law to 'covet and
contemplate with their inward eye the expresse and perfect Image of an
English Lawyer'. 17 Art can aid in improving the public perception of the
profession and it can facilitate dissemination and acceptance of decisions if
the lawyers know what they are talking about. If, to borrow one of
Doderidge's examples, a case concerns 'a maime ', say loss of an arm, then
the advice of surgeons and medics should be sought so as to understand what
the injury means. Without knowledge, law is vacant.
The remedy for juridical ignorance is also interesting. Law touches
potentially on all disciplines. It is truly interdisciplinary in the sense of being
without discipline. There are two reasons for this. The first is that
jurisprudence is, for civilians and common lawyers alike, a knowledge of
things divine and human. In touching matters spiritual, in addressing and
being addressed by the divinity, law reflects whatever God or sovereign
might care to say. And they can, as we know, on occasion say anything:
declare war on imaginary grounds, devise elaborate internal regimes of
expense account, announce, in a recent example in the United States, that the
medically dead are still living. So too, the causes that come before the
lawyer, the pathology, madness, and injuries that get litigated can call upon
any number of skills of apprehension and determination. That being so, the
best training is general and expansive. Law, in Ramist Latin, is scientia
scientiarum, the Science of Sciences:
and therein lies hid the knowledge almost of every other learned science: But
yet I pray consider, that those forraine knowledges, are not inherent or inbred
in the Lawes, but rather as a borrowed light not found there, but brought
thither .. . 18

All knowledge is potentially relevant to law. All disciplines can be invoked,
or nest hidden there, and law must be open to them. Doderidge is not
exceptional in making this argument. We find it also in Fraunce and in

16 Doderidge, op. cit., n. 9, p. 39.
17 id. , p. I.
18 id., p. 35.

468
© 2009 The Author. Journal Compilation © 2009 Cardiff Uni vers ity Law School

Fulbeck, in Cowell and in Finch. The mark of the excellent lawyer is
'generall good learning' . 19 Everything within the liberal sciences, the
conceptual disciplines, that might train the mind or increase the knowledge
of the subject will be of aid.
Lastly, and here we approach most directly the concerns of Professor
Samuel, the specific method for acquisition and manipulation of the
knowledges that are necessary to law, comes traditionally in the form of the
invocation of reason or the necessity of logic. Law may be unamenable to
scientific method in its modem sense, in that it can never be practised in a
closed environment, as also it will always concern human relations which,
according to Aristotle amongst others, are not amenable to certainty but only
to probability. That does not mean, however, that law cannot in its operation
and application be subject to method, to disposition (oeconomialdispositio) ,
and to systematization. The substantive curriculum in law, as devised by the
Ramists, was an exercise in scholastic reasoning, in dialectic and then the
rhetoric of argument. The best example is probably Finch's Nomotechnia, or
'Art of Law' .20 We start with general propositions, the maxims of law that
Fortescue and then Bacon had elaborated as the exempla of legal argument.
Clothed in Latin, and tabulated according to discipline, the maxims find their
best systematization in Noy's collection compiled in the 1640s and
organized according to their disciplines of origin: theology, grammar, logic,
philosophy, politics, morality, law, and custom. 21 Other authors offer similar
schemes of seemingly esoteric though in fact quite ordinary propositions
from diverse disciplines. From these premises, arguments can be drawn and
methods of logical schematization developed. Fraunce is to the same
effect. 22 One takes the cases, extracts a maxim, a dictum, a rule and then
elaborates it.
It is the fate of government and law as practices, as opposed to sovereign
pronouncements, divine decrees or other manifestations of regnum
providentiae or absolute power, to exist in uncertainty and probability.23
They deal with relations and they require, returning momentarily to
Agamben' s thesis, management and administration, accommodation, and
disposition in the sense of ordering, which we now more positively term
19 id.,p.33.
20 Sir H. Finch, Nomotechnia (1613). I have used the 1759 edition, published in English
as Law or a Discourse Thereof in Four Books. On the various texts and translations,
see W. Prest, 'The Dialectical Origins of Finch's Law' (1977) 36 Cambridge Law J.
326.
21 W. Noy, The Grounds and Maxims, and also an Analysis of the English Laws (1641 /
1808).
22 A. Fraunce, The Lawiers Logike, exemplifying the praecepts of logike by the practise
of the common !awe ( 1588).
23 Agamben, op. cit., n. 5, pp. 197- 203 usefully elaborates on the theology of the
distinction between providence and destiny as at the root of the distinction between
sovereignty and government as administration.
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method. That being so, the early-modern move to systematize law did not
push to constitute law as an autonomous discipline but, rather, sought to
equip the lawyer with a training that would draw on all relevant disciplines
and would recognize that this borrowing or translation into law required a
degree of tact. It was important that the lawyer appeared well educated,
articulate, knowledgeable, and equipped to judge. Jurisprudence, as one later
systematizer of the visual presence of law expressed it, is the 'image of the
public good'. 24 Logic, dialectic, and rhetoric could help substantially in
perfecting that image of the lawyer and in retailing the institution and
profession. The disciplines have their uses, a sentiment that Doderidge
elaborates in terms of 'sciences and vertues intellectuall adorning the minde,
as the Liberall'. 25 The lawyer brings at best their innate ingenii acumen or
ready understanding to these diverse pursuits. The law is the outsider. It is
not as if there is anything particularly special about law as a discipline, even
if the external and foreign sources of its respectability are generally kept well
hidden. They are, as we have reviewed, generally continental and civilian,
theoretical and textualist.

THE METHOD OF INDISCIPLINE
What is past is prologue. This is so in several senses. I will draw on two.
First, a new technology generates what Derrida wittily called a 'crisis of
destination' and thence a move to self-reflection, a hermeneutic reappraisal,
within the disciplines. 26 The internet has not only repeated the seismic shift
that print had earlier enacted upon the disciplines but it has also in many
respects undone the hierarchy of texts as well as both the sanctity and storage
of law that had been achieved by print and the indefinite murmur of writing
confined to libraries. The new media generate a new world, a novel configuration of ordo, lex, medium in the classical trinity. 27 Homo juridicus, the
space of law, the discipline of the jurist, the interdisciplinary knowledge of
law have all again come under critical scrutiny, as also have the ethics of the
lawyer and the justice of legal judgment. The mos Britannicus seems more
than ever, or perhaps simply again and visibly disordered, somewhat
random, lacking in scholarly discipline, theory, and method. This is what
Samuel is concerned with and focused upon in a recent book, as also in an
expansive series of articles published both here (which is to say there,
namely England) and in France.
Professor Samuel is so disillusioned with common law method, so
despairing of building a discipline out of the Anglican tradition, that he
24
25
26
27

F. Menestrier, Le Veritable art du blason (1673) preface.
Doderidge, op. cit., n. 9, p. 36.
J. Derrida, The Postcard: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond (1992) 232.
On which, see P. Goodrich, 'Screening Law' (2009) 21 law and literature I.
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focuses almost exclusively upon the history of Roman law, and the mos
Gallicus in particular. He is concerned to pose rhetorical questions. 'Is law
really a social science?' The answer is no, it is a dogmatic pursuit within an
authority paradigm. 'Can legal reasoning be demystified?' The answer is no,
or at least not by lawyers playing at philosophy within an authority
paradigm: they are 'just rearranging the deckchairs on a fantasy ship'. 28
Finally, 'should law be taken seriously by scientists and social scientists?'
The answer is no, law is trapped, as you have doubtless only very recently
read, in an authority paradigm that precludes any very meaningful contribution either to science or to sociology. We need, in this view, to step
away from the authority paradigm, show some respect to the other
disciplines, and endeavour to comprehend, though here I am pushing his
argument somewhat, the community of lawyers as a somewhat idiosyncratic
form of life. To do this, we would do best to tum to continental thought, to
treatises on epistemology, and specifically to the study of method as
elaborated in and through comparative legal theory. It is not rights so much
as it is method that needs to be taken seriously. 29 Sound familiar? This, of
course, is precisely the theme that I have traced in the earlier English
tradition. Common law needed method, it was as extant a sorry mixture of
pathology and system, case and commentary that could only be deemed as
lacking in both scholarship and logic by the Ramist inspired authors of the
foundational era of properly Anglican government.
The earlier era of reform, the erudition of Fraunce, Fulbeck, and Finch,
Smith, Spellman, Selden to name but a few, did not have too great a practical
or, shall we say, distributive impact upon the discipline of law. Therein lies
the interest in returning to them. They were never really incorporated, their
suggestions remained suggestions. No successful university curriculum in
common law was devised - the third university aside - and the compromises
and conflicts between professionals and professors remained unresolved and
seldom did the two meet or talk outside of the elite arches of Oxbridge where
the discussions were more political than technical. When Dicey and others,
and most notably Langdell in the United States, propelled common law into
the university curriculum in the late nineteenth century, not so long ago as
Samuel opines, their model, predicated closely on the suggestions of the
Ramists as purveyed through Blackstone, in the end did little more than
institute the tired schematic curriculum of cases, a compromise between
profession and scholarship that so favoured the professional that it was
practitioners and not scholars who formed the advanced guard of the new
university discipline, did the teaching, and compiled the professional and
pedagogic manuals. And then, as Samuel at one point caustically and
incisively notes, law is taught today as it was taught 50 years ago. One could
28 Samuel, op. cit. (2009), n. 12, p. 210.
29 G. Samuel, 'Taking Methods Seriously (Part One)' (2007) 2 J. of Comparative Law
94, and 'Taking Methods Seriously (Part Two)' (2007) 2 J. of Comparative Law 210.
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expand that. It is taught now pretty much as it was taught 100 years ago in
the early days of the new syllabus. It is taught as a collection of cases
organized around thematic topics conjured in the main from the subjectmatter of the decisions studied. Add a few European Directives, some
statutory subject-matter, a few classes on the legal system and its component
parts, throw in an incoherent discussion of the 'essential' (and essentially
contested) distinction between rationes decidendi and obiter dicta, and stop
there. An elective in jurisprudence, an option in gender, crime, sociology of
law, or some even more eccentric course on law 'and' - literature, history,
film, aesthetics, psychoanalysis - may bring the student into contact with the
questions of method and discipline that Samuel raises, but these are by now,
at this point in the curriculum, secondary engagements, not real law but
school lore. 30 So the argument and the practice goes.
Support for Samuel's argument can be taken from some other
contemporary sources. He mentions the lesser status of comparative law,
if genuinely treated as comparative, and notes the frequent characterization
of such an interest as a form of dilettantism, as if method, thought about the
discipline, was an ornament, an illicit pleasure, a distraction. We can add
Supiot's Homo juridicus, an extended meditation on the growing irrelevance
of law, its subversion and marginalization by the internationalization of
markets and the global yet virtual presence of the web. 31 Market drive, law
and economics, the absolutes of cost benefit analysis, the ecfactic calculus
take over the space of thought and hence also the terrain of law. 32 So, too,
the boundaries of promulgation and implementation are eradicated by the
fluidity of fibre optics, wireless connections, and the laptop computer which
can connect any subject, anywhere, to any place: appropriately enough the
terminal is now called (Mac) 'Air', and nominally at least invokes a
Pythagorean metaphysics. What cannot be confined to a jurisdiction escapes
law. If territorial competence is a precondition of judgment, of the lex terrae
as such, if the juridical is by definition attached to and circumscribed by text
and territory, then the erosion of the boundaries of text and territory, the
slippage into spectral portals, hypertext markup language (html), and the
virtuality of the world wide web are all potentially witness to the diffusion
and evaporation of the concept and procedures of legality. As Linda
Mulcahy points out in her study of video appearances in court, you don't
30 C. McCrudden, 'Legal Research and the Social Sciences' (2006) Law Q. Rev. 632,
argues that we are all socio-legal now, and this may be true, as F. Cowney, Legal
Academics: Culture and Identities (2004) rather depressingly suggests, but this says a
lot about the law professor's self-perception as a scholar and nothing of what they
teach or do within the institution as a mode of reproduction of law.
31 A. Supiot, Homo Juridicus: On the Anthropological Function of Law (2007), and for
commentary, see P. Goodrich, 'Law's Labour's Lost' (2009) 72 Modern Law Rev.
296.
32 On the ecfactic calculus, see P. Goodrich, 'The New Casuistry' (2007) 33 Critical
Inquiry 673, at 700.
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really any longer have to show up. You can teleport in on a hard line, arrive
as an image, answer in real time but from no legally recognized place,
engendering perhaps a modern version of a classical legal fiction, which
would go something like 'Xis on earth, Mars or Kansas, to wit in London'. 33
From a different though associated perspective the international
community also suffers a species of demise along with the erasure of
national boundaries. The fragmentation is well delineated by Carty in his
Philosophy of International Law, a book that argues most forcefully that
there is no philosophy of international law. 34 This absence of method
deprives international law not only of any disciplinary identity but also of
any critical or political relevance. Where Supiot, writing in a French context,
argues that dogma and doctrine are suffering a contemporary destruction at
the hands of international corporate self-interest, political indifference, and
legal academic ineptitude - the blankness of 'law and economics' - leading
to incoherent or inaudible resistance in favour of thought, Carty too views
the decline in common lawyers' critical apprehension of international law as
lying squarely in their lack of erudition and their failure of will. The legal
academy is more supine than disciplining in any strong sense, effectively
abandoning doctrine, the invention of thought, scholarship proper and
political, in favour of simply systematizing what states do and what
international courts of precarious jurisdiction and dubious authority happen
to say. The unhappy consciousness of the legal academic here proves
debilitating rather than provoking any sustained intervention in the sources
of unease, the practices of states.
There is a common trajectory to follow, a critical evaluation of a historical
lack of will, a refusal of intellectual discipline within the legal academy, a
resistance to theory, and an abdication of the creative role of doctrine as
something more than second-order law reporting. The fault lies as much on
the left as on the right, indeed, more so in that there is at least a species of
guild consistency in excluding scholarly critical re-evaluation from the
pragmatic isolationism of law as a solemnizing institution and serious social
theatre of justice and truth. The absence of theory is the thorn that pricks
Samuel's side, and which he tracks remorselessly in terms of the failure to
generate a discourse on method, leaving the legal academy without any
independent object of study, and equally without intellectual purpose beyond
self-reproduction of the guild. There is no answer to the fundamental question
of what is doctrine, no discourse on whether it is anything more than or of any
greater scholarly and political value than retailing what courts say. It is a
question that Carty attacks in terms of the history of international lawyers
treating the state as sacrosanct and so immune to meaningful critique because
33 L. Mulcahy, 'The Unbearable Lightness of Being? Shifts Towards the Virtual Trial'
(2008) 35 J. of Law and Society 464, where she also notes the eradication of
thresholds occasioned by video links.
34 A. Carty, The Philosophy of International Law (2007).
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the proper object of legal academic choirs and juridical acclamations lies in
celebration and promulgation of an unquestioned norm. The left mirrors
acclamation in the mode of heckling, demystification, and denunciation with
an equal absence of substantive content. Samuel treats a similar phenomenon
in comparative law, an exemplary inter-discipline for his argument: lacking
training in method, without critical tools with which to address the social
pathologies, political over-investments, and relational corporate contexts
with which law, national and international, regulatory and facilitative, has to
deal, lawyers can offer little beyond the mouthing of platitudes and the timid
vacuity of school-bound academic law, that very English idiom: 'it is
fervently to be hoped that their Lordships will reconsider the remit and
nuance of their decision in Seldom v. Never'; 'one is bound to acknowledge,
though with the utmost respect, that the Court perhaps erred on the side of
gratuitous generosity in their interpretation of Cribbed v. Constrained';
'authority resiles to the fact that the rule in Minimal v. Nothing is now to be
deemed otiose' , and such and similar in tone and affray.
If we accept that the new technologies unsettle the time-honoured
practices of professionalization of law students and equally acknowledge
that this is not a novelty but just another historic challenge to an institution
that changes only when it is left with no political choice but to change, then
there are some preliminary conclusions to be drawn from the contemporary
encounter, the dissonance between disciplines and law. The first is simple
enough and common to all of the contemporary critics mentioned, Supiot
and Samuel, Carty, Murphy, and Legrand. These critics are marginal and
uncomfortable figures . Like Petrus Ramus and Abraham Fraunce, they
appear foreign, external, ill at ease, and frankly estranged in common law. It
is tempting, maybe salutary is a better word, to look at the excursions and the
exodus, the diaspora of the critics of English law as an exemplification of the
thesis not only that thresholds and boundaries have disappeared but also that
there has been a species of more unsettling flight. A generation in exile
perhaps. Consider the geographic dispersion as a metaphor for disciplinary
displacement, a movement to the margins of cartograph and curriculum
alike. This can be read as a species of taking a break, on the model of a
couple having some time apart, or as divorce in a jurisdiction that still
requires cause and so leaves the couple married but separated. Put it another
way, and one can observe that the critics are not relating either to England or
to law very much any longer. As Samuel puts it, there is little on offer in the
common law schools to excite the intellect. He has a favourite example:
three students leave for university to study sociology, cinema, and Iaw.35 The
first two get an education that includes a significant dimension of theory, the
law student does not. The cinema student will graduate with an understanding of film technique, of director's styles, and of theoretical schools and
35 Samuel , op. cit. (2008), n. 12, p. 31 I. For further discussion, see Samuel, op. cit. (Part
I), n. 29, pp. 105- 10.
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approaches, and will be able to distinguish hermeneutics, structuralism,
deconstruction, and functionalism. The law student will graduate with none
of that or at least with only the very loosest of senses of the methodology of
law - it is like a chain novel, it is what officials do, it is commands or rules and almost no conception of the long-term history of the discipline, of the
mos Britannicus as expounded briefly here. They graduate with the narrowest
of conceptions of system and law, akin for all essential purposes to the
blinkered world of faith that confines the graduating student in theology.
Except that the theology student knows that God moves in mysterious ways,
that the choir invisible cannot be seen, and so has been taught to address
'what is not' and has no being through faith and prayer. So perhaps Samuel's
example of the cinema student is a better guide, closer to my interests
anyway, and the disjunction can be clarified somewhat. The film student
learns film criticism, the schools of cinematic thought - and the history is
here genuinely not that long-lived, be it in England or abroad - as well as the
oeuvre of great directors, national and international. Further, however, and
this is surely crucial, the student of film learns how to make a film, how to
produce images, how to assemble, cut, fade and frame, track and pan, build a
scene, a flashback, a montage. Law students are not so well served. They
learn about the schools in jurisprudence, should they elect it, and they read
some of the sages of common law, the great judges, the mavericks and
innovators, but that is not systematic, does not come with method or
diachronic engagement. Worse, the making of law, the production of norms,
the commercial and political assembling of bodies of judgment, patterns of
normative development, the grids within which genres of precedent are
constructed are never the object of critical theoretical examination. The law
student is not simply not taught to examine the process of legal production
and reproduction of doctrine as a social form but they are positively
dissuaded from engaging with the authorship of judgments, the directorial
capacities of judges, the assemblage and scenography of decision.
Stay with this separation for a moment. It has two sides. The distance
between critic and discipline mirrors that between theory and law. The law
curriculum may not study or provide insight into theory, but then the
theorists in the end or in exile offer no real reading of law. David Campbell
made the point well in a necessarily satirical piece in which he pointed out
that when social theory descended upon law in the 80s, the theorists were
unimpeded by any knowledge of law. Not a clue, he points out, as to the
substantive rules and practices that they were demolishing, revising,
deriding, summoning and sentencing en masse. 36 Samuel makes a version
36 D. Campbell, 'The Limits of Concept Formation in Legal Science ' (2000) 9 Social
and Legal Studies 439, especially at 441 :
In studying law as it were internally, in the sense of being able to reason as a
lawyer, and especially to handle the sources of the law, one immediately gains the
advantage so often lost in general social theory, of tending to know what one is
talking about.
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of the same point at a more ab5tract level but quite explicitly: 'If, then,
escape is on the agenda, perhaps law schools should start by looking in much
more diachronic depth at the construction of their discipline '. 37 Then, of
course, Samuel himself escapes, at least to some degree, by addressing
civilian concepts and Roman discourses on method, the mos Ga/lieus and not
the mos Britannicus which the English indeed, and ironically enough, always
deemed to be much older than the law of the Romans, and the Venetians and
the Greeks as well. Veritably antique, an archaism one could legitimately
say. But that oblivion, or perceptual defence, or simple insouciance of course
reflects as much the critic's resistance to law, the preconceptions of the
theorist, the academic projections of practice and precedent. What I have
argued, and fully aware that Samuel is exceptional in his erudition,
exemplary in his knowledge of the detail of English private law, is that it has
a history of discourses on method, a rich diachronic patterning. While this
may well gain significant benefits from comparison to and revision by way
of civil Jaw - these too were its roots - there is a necessary intermediary
stage, a thing or two to be learned both as to resistance to theory and as to
substantive curriculum and common use from the deep history, the sense of
tradition, of the methodus - mode and rhythm - of custom and practice, of
the long past of common law.

LECTIO MIXTA , OR BY WAY OF CONCLUSION
The common plea of the critics of common law is not in any sense hostile to
the argument that foreign sources, external theories, and civilian rules be taken
seriously. Nor is there any argument as to the importance of method and the
priority of history. Indeed, if exile and exodus have a predominant purpose, it
is that of retooling, that precisely of learning those things that were missing
from the legal curriculum. The more burning question - and my sense is that
Geoffrey Samuel is already on his way to the channel tunnel train, leaving the
white cliffs of Dover behind, as it were, for a richer foreign soil - is whether
the excursion into the foreign disciplines ever leads to a return to Jaw, to
common law, to little England. The critics have a tendency to go native, to find
a greater interest or cause, in short, to abandon Jaw for administration,
philosophy, film, Aix en Provence, China or the antipodes, as the case may be.
Put it like this, the discourse on method is a precursor, a prolegomenon,
because one studies method in relation to a practice and if the practice has
evaporated, then method becomes an internal discourse, a study of
methodology in general and not in any particular at all. Even interdisciplinary
studies have to specify which disciplines they are not, and so engage with
topics, and invent themes that fall between, below or outside the norm.

37 Samuel, op. cit. (2008), n. 12, p. 3 15.
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The first thing to say is that the recourse to the interdisciplinary at least
expresses a desire, a willingness to account for the lacunae of law, an effort
at self-reflection and a critical disciplinary self-awareness. Without some
sense of the place of law within the disciplines, the before the law of the
legal institution, to borrow from Kafka, there is no discipline at all. Just
practice, professional guild conceit, the dust of records, the residue of
archaisms, the esoterica of filing clerks and their judicial progeny. So the
first step, materialist and historicist in its detail, is that of giving pause for
thought. The interdisciplinary simply means the creation of a space, an
institutional site for exchange, conversation, ratiocination, intellection, call it
what you will, within which humanistic encounter knowledge can be shared
and preconceptions questioned or explained. It sounds deceptively simple
but such spaces are generally not available in law, where the community of
lawyers tend to advocate rather than interrelate, and where closure dominates
the discursive form. The seminar rooms, corridors, alcoves of law school are
not so hospitable socially, neither are they open epistemically, disinclined as
they tend to be to dialogue, nor in any obvious sense conversant either with
the method of law or of other disciplines. Too often we meet the figure
whom Doderidge nicely terms the legal temerist, the professor in a blind rush
to judgment, intent only on proving his point, his worth and so conforming
rather too easily to the almost comical persona of the 'authority paradigm',
the dogmatist who cannot stay to explain in any sustained way why she
thinks that philosophy, theory, hermeneutics, literature or deconstruction or
some imagined spectre bearing that name should be banished, branded,
destroyed. As if their opinion somehow carried an unreal and unreasoned
weight. Which, of course, is the problem with the authority paradigm.
The interdisciplinary paradigm, by contrast, opens up to the logic of
chance, the chaos of thought, and the transformations of events. What is at
issue, in other words, is a space of intellection, in publishing terms diverse
fora of exchange, in pedagogic contexts mobile sites of interdisciplinary
interaction. A coming face to face with other disciplines. Sounds easy, but it
gets hard. Who will pay for that? Who will supervise, mediate, attend, and
care for these critical but subversive, radical but secretive moments and
occasions? Does coming back mean going underground? Or worse, being
ridiculed, ignored, derided, in short, envied and dismissed, feared and
discounted? Why such a price to pay and who in the end are now the
guardians of academic law who dare to impose their views, their prejudices
against the free play of thought? Put it like this, take an example indeed from
the philosophy of science, the simplest of lessons, the hardest to hear, it is
chance, humour, accident, and luck that have led to the greatest discoveries,
the paradigm-changing events within the Western tradition. 38 Give it a go,

38 This, of course, was the central thesis of Paul Feyerabend: P. Feyerabend, Against
Method (1976).
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take off from some seemingly ·incidental or marginal, paradigm-defying
instance, and see where it goes. That is the lesson that Feyerabend
expounded, and we can find the same in the elegant historicism of Carlo
Ginsberg: it is precisely the marginal, the unnoticed or overlooked elements
in a painting that betray its veracity and allow the apprehension offorgery. 39
It is the Morellian method, a Freudian development which again allows us to
note that there is much to be learned, and not just about the madness of Judge
Schreber, from the pyschoanalytic school. That is a personal observation as
well. If the critics who spend endless hours elaborating Freud, Lacan, Jung,
Legendre, or indeed Adam Philips or Darian Leader, spent just a fraction of
that time devoted to theory in addressing their own analysis, in practising
what they preach, their interdisciplinarity would be immeasurably improved.
But they tend not to, which suggests that the flip side of the authority
paradigm, blind self-confidence, is narcissistic fury, a drive to exteriorize the
pain within, a projection of the wound.
Let me be explicit about the last point because it is a little close to the
bone, and sometimes attracts criticism. I don't want the assessors, who will
of course remain faceless and nameless, the bureaucratically co-opted legal
academics, lacking any real training in or sense of method, taking me to task,
lowering my ranking, denying me international recognition. I suspect that
Professor Samuel could also beneficially attend to the point. So the argument
is that the refusal of the theorist and critic to engage with law gets replicated
in the inability of the expositors of psychoanalytic theory to address their
own analysis. You could say that this is the madness of law but in fact,
viewed historically, it is simply the desertion of the casuistic function of
legal analysis, an opting out of one of the principal jurisdictions annexed to
common law, that of the courts of conscience and their theological rules
governing what happens in the soul. We use a different jargon now but our
subject as lawyers is still in large measure the subject, the legal person and
its actions, single and several, and because of this some understanding of
persons, of subject formation, of interactive and communicative patterns and
the critical skills by which to reflect upon them might well come in
practically useful as well as theoretically important. Just consider for a
moment the maxim that 'motive is not consideration' and think of it as an
oratorical definition, as denial in Freudian terms, which it clearly is, and
perhaps the picture becomes a hint clearer. We are constantly at the edge of
our knowledge, on the boundary between law and desire, dealing with
symptoms of historical repression, judicial evasion, social and economic
exploitation. We are also, however, and the critics have tended to forget this,
the product of those very same forces . They are in us as well as outside us. It
is easier, let's put it as lightly as this, to treat their external manifestations
rather than address their internal hold.

39 C. Ginsberg, Myths, Emblems, Clues (1990).
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There is perhaps, and this is my final point, a misapprehension that
interdisciplinary studies could somehow resolve or move beyond the conflicts, the clashes of schools and other prises de positions that characterize
common law educational institutions. I am not suggesting that at all.
Interdisciplinary studies, and here I will resort again to the desirability of
indiscipline, of simply opening a juncture, reserving a room, making a time or
appointment for entering into the other discipline. In common law, which has
no very strong tradition of disciplinary self-reflection - and much of this
paper has been about recollecting forgotten pathways, lost treatises, dormant
patterns - the value of the interdisciplinary is both practical and theoretical.
At the practical level (let's start with that, it is ever popular in legal circles,
however spurious - who after all is going to read this?), the early common
lawyers were not entirely without insight. Samuel ignores them at his
epistemic peril. They said that where law deals with a subject matter that is
studied by another discipline - agronomics, economics, architecture,
engineering, boatbuilding, medicine, linguistics, sociology, literature or one
of the arts- then it is not without logic to seek advice from, become interested
in, and learn from those other disciplines. A lawyer needs a little disciplinary
bricolage, an open mind, skill in inquiry as opposed to imposition.
The theoretical point is that theory should listen. We can learn here from
the Roman concept of lectio mixta associated with humanist legal reforms of
the early modem era. The lectio mixta was a reading that attended to
competing claims or norms, for example, the diverse proposals that could be
drawn from poetry, literature, and law with respect to a given dispute. The
lectio mixta proposed reading all of those sources, attending to their
diversity, treating them as equal and then, if necessary, after interdisciplinary
deliberation, deciding in response to all three. It is an oxymoronic procedure
in rhetorical argot but that sounds rather strange. The argument is simply and
again that the subject matter of dispute, say contract provisions, requires
attending to who made the agreement, in what context, and when. Contract
lawyers are full of concepts of intention, of words as 'messengers of men's
minds' and interdisciplinarity simply suggests taking those messengers and
messages seriously. What is written is representative rather than definitive,
plural in meaning rather than singular, and so a properly theoretical approach
will address the sociology of the subjects, the economics of the exchange, the
political institutions and ethical forces that were at play. That is simple and
yet scholarly hermeneutics. There are levels to the text and the scholar draws
those out and gives them air. That is the just thing to do. And by the same
token, ifwe are dealing with an international contract, a treaty, then as Carty
expounds it, the very same questions, addressed best through the apprehension of history - knowing what one is talking about is never a harm - as
also through the literature of diplomacy and political theory together, suggest
that critical scholarship inform itself fully of the relations of power, the
history of groups, the minorities and the majorities, the narratives of war,
annexation, and suppression that motivate and put the treaty into play.
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It is the beauty of theory that ·it does not require decision but, rather, and
only, argument, knowledge, and insight brought to bear as invention and
intervention. The social responsibility of the legal theorist, the interdisciplinary scholar mooted here, is that of actually doing the work of theory,
by which I mean coming to know their subject and having the courage to
intervene, to speak to it. That requires pushing past the cliques and coteries,
the exclusions and bumpings that the academy with all its wealth of selfgenerated insignificance is so fond of purveying. Preferring knowledge to
fashion, thought to repetition, indiscipline to imposition, are the virtues of
the interdisciplinary, of inquiry over authority. If, as Agamben suggests, we
exist still within a legal administration, a normative order that is
predominantly choral and liturgical, as much propelled by acclamation as
cerebration, then it is also an act of courage, a moment of indiscipline, to
take the 'sciences liberall' seriously, to try to come to know.
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